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"Inherent Power" and Rule 16: How Far Can a
Federal Court Push the Litigant Toward Settlement?
DAviD

A.

RAMMELT*

Judges ought to remember that their office is jus dicere, and not jus
dare; to interpret law, and not to make law, or give law.
Francis Bacon1
Of those cases initially selected and set for the process, 44.3% have
settled ....

I attribute a good portion of this figure to those cases

which require that extra "push" toward settlement ....
Judge Thomas D. Lambros 2

INTRODUCTION

When a litigant files suit in a federal court, she enters a forum that offers
important guarantees. Presumably, she enters a system that will treat her
like all other litigants in similar situations.3 Her access to the forum should

* J.D., 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; A.B., 1986, Hamilton
College.
1. "Of Innovations," The Works of FrancisBacon, v. XII, 1857-74 (M. Scott ed. 1908).
2. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation
of the Jury System, 103 F.R.D. 461, 473 (1984).
3. Similar treatment, or national uniformity, is an important characteristic of the federal
litigation system. Discussing the tension between federal and local rules of civil procedure,
Judge Robert Keeton of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
writes:
National uniformity serves important interests. Among those interests is the
fundamental interest ... in causing disputes to be resolved on the merits,
according to law, and to be resolved in an evenhanded way so like cases are
treated alike. Outcomes should not depend on the luck of the draw as to what
judge decides the case, and for stronger reasons should not depend on judge
shopping or forum shopping.
Uniformity of procedure helps lawyers and parties know what to expect and
how to proceed. It reduces surprise. It promotes fairness-at least when the
uniform rule is a good rule. It promotes efficiency in the use of lawyer time and
other resources.
Also-and as a trial judge myself perhaps I will be forgiven for stating the
point bluntly-nationally uniform rules protect (though of course not fully)
against the tyranny of any unduly willful renegades among us trial judges.
Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv.
853, 860 (1989).
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be neither more nor less encumbered than that of all other litigants. 4 She
should pay neither more nor less than it costs to defend or pursue similar
claims. She should face an unbiased judge or jury. She should be judged
by the same laws, evenly applied, should abide by the same procedures and
should have the same notice and knowledge of these laws and procedures
as all other litigants.
The federal judicial system has generally aspired to protect this picture
of a fair, accessible trial. The guarantees associated with a fair trial,
however, have exacted a cost from the system.5 An explosion in the number
of lawsuits and regulatory actions filed each year in federal court, coupled
with a simultaneous increase in the length and complexity of trials, has
resulted in what many perceive to be an unmanageable demand on the
6
federal judiciary.
4. According to Judge Jack Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which govern the federal system,
were intended to guarantee access to the federal courthouse:
Few disagree that the Federal Rules were intended by their drafters to open
wide the courthouse doors ....
The drafters' commitment was to a civil practice
in which all parties would have ready access to the courts and to relevant
information, a practice in which the merits would be reached promptly and
decided fairly. Every claimant would get a meaningful day in court. In the golden
age of federal civil procedure, the federal courthouse was the beacon to which
those with serious substantive grievances could turn for direction toward justice.
Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to
Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. R~v. 1901, 1906 (1989).
5. While a set of rules has been promulgated to steer the course of litigation through the
federal system, and while few would dispute the need for these rules, the procedural rules
themselves sometimes contribute to the problem. "Delay and excessive expense now characterize
a large percentage of all civil litigation. The problems arise in significant part ... from abuse
of the discovery procedures available under the Rules." Order of April 29, 446 U.S. 995, 999
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
6. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL CoURrs: CRIsis AND REFoRm 65, 80 (1985) (excess litigation
in the federal courts has placed an unmanageable strain on the federal judiciary); see Sherman,
Restructuring the Trial Process in the Age of Complex Litigation (Book Review), 63 TEx. L.
REv. 721, 722 (1984) ("Cases that take years to prepare, involve reams of documents and
hundreds of hours of depositions, and require weeks or months to try have taxed the resources
of our judicial system to the breaking point."). According to Professor Judith Resnik, a
frequent critic of judicial activism, there are several possible explanations for the last decade's
docket explosion, chief of which are: (1) a population increase, (2) a proliferation of congressionally-created statutory claims, (3) greater attorney accessibility due to an increase in the
number of lawyers combined with a resulting decrease in fees and (4) an incentive to litigate,
most often in the corporate context, induced by the potential recovery of attorney fees. Resnik,
-ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982).
Some observers, however, dispute the contention that the "explosion" is a recent development, or that the threat it presents is as dire as many would believe:
Concern over excess litigation in the federal courts is also typically exaggeration ....
The truth about the "litigation explosion" is that it is a weapon of perception,
not substance. If the public can be persuaded that there is a litigation crisis, it
may support efforts to cut back on litigation access ....
The "explosion" idea is [however] wrong as a matter of fact ....
Weinstein, supra note 4, at 1907-09.
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In 1984, Chief Justice Warren Burger devoted his entire Year-End Report
on the Judiciary to the problem of court congestion. The Chief Justice
noted that the number of trials lasting more than thirty days had increased
an astounding 344% in the ten-year period ending with 1981. He warned
that, unless a solution were created, the problem would be exacerbated by
a trend of new filings and longer trials. Three years later, Chief Justice
William Rehnquist lamented that, despite efforts to remedy the situation,
the trend toward more litigation had continued and could be expected to

worsen.'
A disturbing consequence of this crisis confronting the federal judiciary
is that many district court judges, especially sensitive to the problem, feel
compelled to implement ad hoc procedures to expedite, and in some cases
circumvent, the formal process. 9 Broadly termed "Alternative Dispute Resolution" (ADR), these ad hoc procedures have gained acceptance in the
legal community as a practical solution to the docket-crisis confronting the
federal judiciary. 0

While there is a need to explore creative means to resolve the docketcrisis, a dilemma results when these alternative procedures are forcibly

7. Burger, Year-End Report on the Judiciary (1984) (available from the Public Information
Office of the United States Supreme Court).
8. In 1987, Chief Justice Rehnquist warned that "despite the determined efforts of
everyone associated with the federal judiciary, both new filings and pending cases continue at
high and in some instances record levels. Unfortunately, there is a good likelihood that our
workload will become heavier." Rehnquist, Year-End Report on the Judiciary 4 (1987)
(available from the Public Information Office of the United States Supreme Court). Chief
Justice Rehnquist's prophecy was fulfilled a year later when he reported that filings in the
district courts rose from 279,087 to 283,000 criminal and civil cases, with 272,000 civil and
criminal cases pending. Rehnquist, Year-End Report on the Judiciary 11 (1988) (available from
the Public Information Office of the United States Supreme Court).
9. See Resnik, FailingFaith:Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 494
(1986). Professor Resnik reflects that "ADR (in the form of court-annexed arbitration, judicial
settlement conferences, summary jury trials and mediation) offers not only an alternative to,
but often a replacement for, adjudication." Id. at 536.
10. The crisis is due, in part, to a legal system that is reluctant to abandon established
procedural tradition. See R. PosNmR, supra note 6. Judge Richard Posner has depicted the
traditional formal process as empty and formalistic, a facade of procedural regularity in an
unfair world in which technicalities and ritualism are observed before justice. See also Resnik,
supra note 9, at 544-45. Professor Resnik, a proponent of caution when addressing and
instituting change in the current litigation system, recognizes that the condition of the present
system demands attention:
I agree that the procedural format crafted fifty years ago no longer responds
adequately to many issues that consume us today: the gross imbalance between
litigants in certain kinds of disputes, the inabilities and misbehavior of lawyers
and parties in categories of cases, the large number of disputes seeking attention,
and the enormous difficulties, in some cases, in claiming that the outcomes
achieved resemble "truth" or any approximation of it.
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imposed." If the litigant is forced to participate in ADR, procedural and
substantive protections-most notably uniform treatment and access to
trial-may be sacrificed for judicial economy.
This Note will address the nature and scope of those powers by which
the federal judiciary may implement mandatory or compulsory ad hoc ADR.
This Note focuses specifically on the "Summary Jury Trial" (SJT), and
will suggest that the exercise of such procedures must be restrained where
they restrict the litigant's access to the courts or disparage the federal
promise of uniformity. Part I briefly describes those mandatory ADR
methods commonly used by federal judges. Part II explores the litigant's
right of access to the federal courts. Part III examines the perceived sources
of power by which to implement ad hoc procedures that threaten access.
Part IV examines limitations on judicial management in the settlement
process and explores the relationship between settlement activism and ADR
implementation by focusing on issues common to judicially negotiated
settlement, mandatory arbitration and the SJT. Part V surveys the current
federal case law. Finally, Part VI addresses the legal and practical limitations
on mandatory ADR.
This Note concludes that, regardless of their docket problems, federal
judges should not unilaterally impose mandatory, ad hoc procedures designed to discourage trial participation by coercing settlement. Absent explicit recognition by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such procedures
should be invoked only with the consent of the litigants.

I.

ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES

A.

Background

Dissatisfied with the pronounced, systemic inefficiencies of the formal
litigation machine, the legal profession has, with increasing frequency,

11. One of the responsibilities of the federal judge, argues Judge Weinstein, is to safeguard
the decision of the litigant to avail herself of the protection of the federal system:
The judge qua judge, however, has little impact on the choice between lawsuits

and alternatives.... [Clourts may not encourage [alternative] methods of resolving disputes by making it more difficult to commence or to prosecute and
defend lawsuits. Once the parties choose to come to court, the judge should
fulfill his or her responsibility to public office by hearing their dispute, and not
sending them elsewhere.
Address by Judge Jack B. Weinstein, "Judges and Alternative Dispute Resolution," ABA
Session on Judicial Power and ADR (Toronto, Canada, August 9, 1988).
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discovered the utility of ADR.12 Premised on flexibility, ADR has the
capacity to adapt to the needs and resources of the individual litigant. 3
Proponents argue that the remedy achieved is at least as satisfying to the
litigant as that possible through traditional channels.1 4 Moreover, given the
inevitable delays and expense that plague the formal legal machine, 5 ADR
16
may very well present the only effective means of resolving a dispute.

12. See generally Alfini, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts: An Introduction,
69 JuicxATRE 252 (1986); Barnett, The Importance of Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Reducing Litigation Costs as a CorporateObjective, 53 AN1TrrRusT L.J. 277 (1984); Edelman,
InstitutionalizingDispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 JuST. Sys. J. 134 (1984); Henry, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Meeting the Legal Needs of the 1980s, 1 OHO ST. J. ON DIsPuTE
REsoLUToN 113 (1985); McMillan & Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 NoTmE DAm L. REv. 431 (1985); Nelson, Alternative
Dispute Resolution: A Supermart for Law Reform, 14 N.M.L. Ray. 467 (1984). But see
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HRv. L. Rav. 668
(1986).
The growing acceptance of ADR is evidenced by the fact that ADR, despite its immaturity,
may have gained an institutional stronghold in the administrative operations of the federal
government. It has been reported that Congress is considering legislation that would "create
a 'gravitational pull' toward the use of ADR throughout the government" in civil cases that
involve the United States as a party. LaVelle, Congress Now ConsideringDispute Resolution
Measure, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
13. Flexibility is one of the preeminent advantages of ADR, though the degree of flexibility
varies with the technique. For example, in the arbitration context, the hearings are before a
judge or arbitrator selected on the basis of knowledge and expertise; formal rules of evidence
and trial procedure are avoided because attorneys need not be present. The atmosphere is
informal and relaxed, remedies may be tailored to fit the circumstances, the scheduling and
location of hearings may be arranged for the parties' convenience, and the proceedings may
be conducted in private. See generally Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND.
L.J. 425 (1987-88).
14. In addition to the obvious satisfaction associated with saving court costs and attorney
fees, litigants may be spared the emotional strain attendant lengthy judicial proceedings.
Goldstein, Alternatives for Resolving Business Transaction Disputes, 58 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
69, 75 n.15 (1983); Stipanowich, supranote 13, at 428 n.6. Assessing the viability of arbitration,
Professor Thomas Stipanowich muses, "Having gone to the time and trouble of bringing a
case through interminable pretrial motion practice, attempting to educate the decision maker
while observing the intricacies of trial procedure, and waiting out a lengthy appeal, even a
'victorious' litigant may well question whether justice has been served." Id. at 428.
15. See generally Cooke, The Highways and Byways of Dispute Resolution, 55 ST. JOHN's
L. REv. 611 (1981); Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View from the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245
(1977); McMillan & Siegel, supra note 12. Documenting the pervasive attorney practice of
procrastination and exhaustive preparation, McMillan and Siegel theorize:
[t]he ills of our present litigation system are attributable to the simple phenomenon
that if a lawyer is given five years to do everything he can to win his case, he
will think of five year's worth of activity to improve the chances. The fallacy in
this approach is that the outcome probably would not change much if the same
case were completed in three years or one year.
Id. at 439.
16. For example, delays increase the likelihood that witness testimony will be unavailable
or less reliable at the time of trial, and the absence of such credible or reliable testimony
significantly undermines the probability that the truth will be accurately determined and that
justice will be served. See Nagel, Predicting and Reducing Court-Case Time Through Simple
Logic, 60 N.C.L. Ray. 103, 105 (1981).
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ADR includes any number of informal techniques or processes designed
to reduce the complexity and formality of litigation. Examples of recognized
ADR techniques include the following: arbitration, mediation, conciliation,
mini-trials, summary jury trials, private hearings or trials before retired
judges, private dispute resolution centers, increased magistrate control 7 and
review panels. Participation in ADR, 8 it is hoped, will avoid the formal
system by fostering settlements prior to trial.
Ordinary settlement differs from ADR in two important respects. First,
settlement-sitting down and hammering out a satisfactory resolution through
negotiation-is commonly considered a vestige of the adversary process with
all of its attendant maladies. 9 Conversely, ADR generally provides an arena
that stresses trust and cooperation. 20 Second, ordinary settlement is devoid
of a hearing process. 2' ADR may seek settlement, but it typically involves
some process beyond ordinary negotiations. ADR involves judicial intervention.
A typical first step in ADR involves the judge actively bringing the parties
together for a negotiated settlement. The issues arising from this increased
judicial activism concern both ADR and the institutional role of the court.?

17. The increased use of judicial adjuncts-magistrates and masters-is one solution to
combat the perceived ills of the federal litigation system. The primary debate over such
procedures concerns the scope of article III, and is therefore beyond the scope of this Note.
For a recent discussion of the problems and advantages involved in the use of magistrates and
masters, see Silberman, JudicialAdjuncts Revisited: The Proliferationof Ad Hoc Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. Rv. 2131 (1989).
18. In most ADR, the parties to a dispute voluntarily agree to participate. Voluntary
cooperation often results in an extraordinarily high degree of litigant satisfaction due to the
tremendous potential cost savings. Thus, courts will sometimes propose alternatives to the
litigants. See generally King v. E.F. Hutton Co., 117 F.R.D. 2 (D.D.C. 1987) (court proposing
omnibus settlement conference).
19. "The adversary process-the engine of the adjudicatory system-operates on a theory
of fundamental distrust: Never put faith in the adversary. Litigation thus becomes formal,
tricky, divisive, time-consuming, and distorting." Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. Cm. L. Ray. 424, 427 (1986). Because
settlement is often a ritualistic prelude to the zero-sum game of litigation between opposing
counsel, distrust and manipulation are inevitably present. "In contrast, the creation of trust
is central to the design of many ADR processes." Id. ADR proponents, therefore, proclaim
that the results of ADR are not only superior to litigation, but are also "clearly superior to
conventional settlements." Id. at 429.
20. Id.
21. The ADR method is acutely aware of the litigant's or disputant's psychological need
for the combative elements of the adversarial process and the ensuing therapeutic benefits that
such an encounter produces. Consequently, the vast majority of ADR methods provide some
type of contested hearing wherein the disputants may air their sentiments.
22. "The extent of judicial participation in settlement efforts varies. Generally, the judge
is permitted to participate in negotiation as long as he or she acts as a catalyst, encouraging
settlement but not taking sides." J. TANroaD, Tn TRiAL PRocESS: LAW, TAcncs A"D ETmcs

88 (1983).
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Assessing the propriety of ADR, therefore, requires a clear understanding
of permissible judicial entanglement with the settlement process.2
The parameters of permissible settlement intervention are only broadly
sketched in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 Despite the dependence
2
of the federal judiciary on settlement as a means of winnowing dockets,
the Rules have only recently begun to regulate judicial supervision and
participation in the settlement process. The 1983 amendments to the Rules
formally recognized, for the first time, the district court judge's authority
to assist in pretrial settlement discussions.2 6 Rule 16 explicitly contemplates
"the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial powers to resolve
the dispute. ' 27 The language of the rule, however, is silent regarding what,
if any, limitations exist on the use of "extrajudicial powers."
In addition to their ambiguous statutory power, some federal district
court judges have invoked the doctrine of "inherent powers," 2 either alone
or in conjunction with Rule 16, as authority for implementing ad hoc ADR
procedures designed to induce settlement. The doctrine of inherent power,
however, is as vague as Rule 16, and can result in a style of docket control
commonly, and appropriately, referred to as "managerial judging." 29 The

23. Commentators are divided over the extent to which a federal judge should actively
become involved with or encourage settlement. Compare Lambros, The Judge's Role in
Fostering Voluntary Settlements, 29 Vni. L. REv. 1363 (1983-84) (advocating increased
activism) and Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery Planning, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RuTGERs L. REv. 253
(1983) (judicial activism necessary) with Resnik, supra note 6 (potential for abuse acute with
ad hoc judicial activism).
24. See infra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
25. "It is no secret that the overwhelming majority of legal disputes are settled without
trial." J.TANFoRD, supra note 22, at 87. Judge S. Arthur Spiegel of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio estimates that over 95% of all civil cases are disposed
of before a trial on the merits. Spiegel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. Rv. 829, 832
(1986). Similar estimates, though dated, find that only 6.5% of civil cases reach a trial on the
merits. See AiDmN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRTs ANN. REP. table C4, 388-90 (1980).
26. A number of commentators have argued that prior to the 1983 amendments, settlement
negotiations fell outside the ambit of the original Federal Rules governing pretrial procedure.
See Oesterle, Trial Judges in Settlement Discussions:Mediatorsor Hagglers?, 9 CoRNELL L.F.
7 (1982). Oesterle argues that the original drafters of Rule 16 believed that settlement discussions
were not a desirable facet of the pretrial conference, that the pretrial conference was intended
to refine the issues for trial, and that settlement, while perhaps a byproduct of the conference,
was not the goal of the conference. Id. at 7; see also Note, JudicialAuthority in the Settlement
of Federal Civil Cases, 42 WAsn. & LEE L. REv. 171, 176 (1985) ("In the years immediately
following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most authorities believed that
parties should not discuss the topic of settlement in the presence of the trial judge.").
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
28. See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Constantino, Judges as Case Managers, 17 TRu. 56 (1981); Elliott, Managerial
Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 306 (1986); Peckham, The
Federal Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition,
69 CALIF. L. REv. 770 (1981); Resnik, supra notes 6 & 9; see also Note, supra note 26, at
183. Some commentators advocate a shift in the role of pretrial procedure from a mere trial
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managerial judge "believe[s] that the system does not work; that something
must be done to make it work; and that the only plausible solution to the
problem is ad hoc procedtiral activism by judges."30
One potential danger of this ad hoc activism is that a judge may effectively
coerce, rather than induce, settlement by forcing a litigant to forego his
right to trial. Worse yet, a judge may become so involved in the settlement
process that, should the matter proceed to trial, an unbiased factual and
legal determination becomes impossible." In addition, a mandatory settlement process may cause delay and expense that the litigant would not have
encountered during preparation for the traditional trial.

B.

Compulsory ADR Procedures

Realizing the obvious advantages offered by ADR, the federal judiciary
has begun to experiment with and implement these mechanisms as an
alternative to the formal process. 2 Such innovations are innocuous, if not
commendable, when agreed upon by the parties. As noted above, however,
the judicial practice of mandatorily imposing these procedures on an ad

hoc basis is more dangerous.
Principally, there are two compulsory ADR processes designed to circum-

vent effectively the traditional trial: court-annexed arbitration33 and the
summary jury trial.3

4

Both endeavor to achieve a fair, expedient result by

promoting settlement or relief without the necessity of a trial.
1. Court-annexed Arbitration
Court-annexed arbitration is most often the product of local district court
rule.3 5 Recently, however, Congress has enacted a national arbitration program.3 6 In arbitration, a certain class of cases-most commonly determined
prerequisite to the dominant phase of dispute resolution. Arguing that the benefits to the
substantive litigation process from managerial judging outweigh the procedural unfairness
inherent in ad hoc implementation, Professor E. Donald Elliott concludes, "we will have to
stop thinking of the 'pretrial' process as a prelude to trial, and start thinking of it as the
'main event."' Elliott, supra, at 335. But see Resnik, supra notes 6 & 9.
30. See Elliott, supra note 29, at 309 (emphasis in original).
31. For a discussion of the potential bias problems that may occur when a judge adopts
an activist role, see Oesterle, supra note 26, at 10.
32. See generally infra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text. In this Note, "arbitration" should be
understood to encompass that which is court ordered, either by judicial initiative or local
federal rule, as opposed to arbitration thatis mandated under specific contractual arrangements
between consenting parties (e.g., a collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate labor disputes).
34. See infra notes 47-59 and accompanying text.
35. As of 1985, 16 states and ten federal district courts had authorized court-ordered
arbitration programs. See Edwards, supra note 12, at 668.
36. Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 651-658 (Law. Coop. Supp. 1989). See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
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by the dollar amount of damages37-are referred to one or more arbitrators
who may "tailor relief to fit the circumstances, unbound generally by legal
or equitable principles save their own sense of justice and fairness. ' 38 The
court enters the arbitration award as a final judgment of the court, unless
one of the parties rejects the award by filing a demand for a trial de novo. 39
If a party objects to the award and demands a trial, she may incur
sanctions-arbitrator fees, court costs and/or attorney's fees-if she subsequently loses a formal trial on the merits, or if the final judgment is less
favorable than the arbitration award. 40 Arbitration purportedly does not
jeopardize a party's right to trial by jury or the position of the case on the
court calendar.

41

In October, 1988, Congress passed the Court Reform and Access to
Justice Act of 1988.42 The Act authorizes ten federal district courts, which

operated experimental arbitration programs, to enact local rules providing
for the use of voluntary and mandatory arbitration. 43 The Act extends

37. Under the Act, for example, a district court may "require the referral to arbitration
of any civil action pending before it if the relief sought consists only of money damages not
in excess of $100,000 or such lesser amount as the district court may set, exclusive of interest
and costs." 28 U.S.C.S. § 652(a)(1)(B).
38. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 434.
39. See New Developments: Court Adjunct ADR, 2 Alternative Dispute Resolution Rep.
(BNA) No. 22, at 372 (Oct. 27, 1988) (discussing operation of experimental, court-annexed
arbitration program subsequently expanded by the Act) [hereinafter REPoRT].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 651-658 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) [hereinafter Act].
43. Id. Those sections of the Act that expressly authorize district courts to refer cases to
mandatory arbitration provide:
§ 651. Authorization of Arbitration
(a) Authority of Certain District Courts. Each United States district court ...
may authorize by local rule the use of arbitration in any civil action, including
an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy....
§ 652. Jurisdiction
(a) Actions That May be Referred to Arbitration.
(1) ...a district court that authorizes arbitration under section 651 may(A) allow the referral to arbitration of any civil action ... pending before it
if the parties consent to arbitration, and (B) require the referral to arbitration
of any civil action pending before it if the relief sought consists only of money
damages not in excess of $100,000 or such lesser amount as the district court
may set, exclusive of interest and costs.
(b) Actions That May Not Be Referred Without Consent of Parties. Referral to
arbitration under subsection (a)(1)(B) may not be made(1) of an action based
on an alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution of the United
States, or
(2) if jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on section 1343 of this title.
(c) Exceptions From Arbitration. Each district court shall establish by local rule
procedures for exempting, sua sponte or on motion of a party, any case from
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programs currently in effect, and calls for the United States Judicial
Conference to name ten other districts that will later be authorized to
establish voluntary arbitration programs."
While the Act reflects continuing congressional experimentation with
national ADR, 45 it also recognizes the possibility of local innovation since
"each participating district court is authorized to establish its own unique

arbitration program, reflecting its particular goals and resources."

4

Uniform

court-annexed arbitration, therefore, has not yet arrived. Despite federal

legislation, arbitration generally remains subject to local variation, if it is
ordered at all. The summary jury trial, similar in some respects to courtannexed arbitration, is the second form of mandatory ADR.
2.

The Summary Jury Trial

A revolutionary, and heralded, 47 technique of alternative dispute resolution
is the summary jury trial. 48 The creation of Judge Thomas Lambros, the

arbitration in which the objectives of arbitration would not be realized(1) because the case involves complex or novel legal issues,
(2) because legal issues predominate over factual issues, or
(3) for other good cause.
(d) Safeguards in Consent Cases. In any civil action in which arbitration by
consent is allowed under subsection (a)(1)(A), the district court shall by local
rule establish procedures to ensure that(1) consent to arbitration is freely and knowingly obtained, and
(2) no party or attorney is prejudiced for refusing to participate in arbitration.
Id. (emphasis added).
44. See REPORT, supra note 39, at 371.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The SJT has generally been viewed as an innovative and effective alternative to
traditional litigation, and was endorsed by the 1984 Judicial Conference. DIRECTOR OF THE
ADmNIsTRATIvE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES: SEPTEMBER 19-20 at 88 (1984); see also Lambros,
supra note 2, at 465 (quoting Chief Justice Burger praising the SJT as an effective alternative).
Often, however, analysis of the SJT contemplates that the device will be used with the consent
of the parties. When mandatory, the device has its critics. See Maatman, The Future of
Summary Jury Trials in FederalCourt: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. MARSHA. L. REv.
455 (1988); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm.L. REv. 366 (1986).
48. See generally Lambros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLv. ST. L. REv. 43
(1980). For a detailed presentation of the infant summary jury trial by Judge Lambros to The
Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operating of the Jury System, see
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103
F.R.D. 461, 467 (1984). For later comments and analyses by Judge Lambros, in addition to
rebuttals to criticisms, see Lambros, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure:A New Adversarial
Model for a New Era, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 789 (1989); Lambros, Summary Jury Trial, 37
FED'N INS. & COUNS. CORP. Q. 139 (Winter 1987); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An
Alternative Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JUDICATURE 286 (1986); Lambros, The Summary
Jury Trial, 13 LITIOATION 52 (1986); see also Spiegel, supra note 25. But see Maatman, supra
note 47; Posner, supra note 47, at 366.
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SJT device "is a simple, flexible, and inexpensive settlement alternative. ' 49
As its creator states: "The process is intended to aid and assist the parties
in gaining a realistic perspective of the fair settlement value of their case." 50
Having gained this perspective, the parties are more likely to reassess their
negotiation positions, thus dramatically increasing the possibility of settlement. Even if the goal of settlement is not attained, the technique can "aid
in streamlining jury trials so that the trial process undergoes a more efficient
use of time." ' 51 For these reasons, "durable or hard core cases that are not
settled through conventional pretrial negotiations ' 52 are encouraged, sometimes forced, to engage in the SJT-a sort of pretrial "trial."
The SJT can be especially effective in those cases where certain settlement
barriers are present: (1) where the litigant merely desires to present her case
before some impartial body, (2) where the litigant believes her only chance
of success lies in getting a weak case before a jury, or (3) where the litigant
is incapable of an objective assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
her position.53
While the backbone of the SJT is flexibility, there are certain constants
that characterize the procedure. The SJT is most beneficial when invoked
while the case is substantially in a posture for trial. 54 When discovery and
motion procedure has been completed, the parties commence the process
by submitting a brief containing the relevant legal issues and any proposed
jury instructions. A summary voir dire process results in a petit jury
composed of six members. Judge Lambros states that "[allthough the jurors
are not mislead to believe that the proceeding is equivalent to a binding
jury trial, the non-binding character of the proceeding is not emphasized." 55
The "trial" consists of the litigants' counsel presenting a narrative summation, including fact and argument, of their respective cases. No sworn
witness testimony is taken, though it may be incorporated into the presentation, and the use of exhibits and other trial aids is kept to a minimum.
Objections are discouraged, but in the event counsel oversteps the "bounds
of propriety" during the presentation, the judge is empowered to admonish
accordingly. 6 At the conclusion of the presentations, the jury, after restricted
deliberation, issues either a consensus verdict, or separate, individual verdicts

49. Lambros, Summary Jury Trial, 37
1987).
50. Id.

FED'N INS. & CORP. COUrNS. Q.

139, 139 (Winter

51. Lambros, supra note 2, at 468.
52. Lambros, supra note 49, at 139.
53. See Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604

(D.C. Minn. 1988) (listing examples of situations where settlement obstacles make a particular

case a viable candidate for the SJT); Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial-An Alternative
Method of Resolving Disputes, 69 JuDIcATuRE 286, 286 (1986).
54. Lambros, supra note 2, at 470.
55. Lambros, supra note 53, at 289.
56. Lambros, supra note 2, at 470.
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that reflect each juror's opinion.17 The final stage, a dialogue component
unique to the SJT, provides counsel with ample access to the jurors to

analyze and question their reactions to the issues and counsels' presentations.
The SJT assumes that, after digesting the results, counsel will return to the
settlement negotiating table equipped with a better understanding of the

case.
Judge Lambros reports that of the 49 SJTs held in his courtroom during

the period ending with 1986, 92% resulted in settlement.58 This figure,

according to Lambros, translates into both litigant savings-i.e., expenses

saved by avoiding trial-and an average juror-cost savings of "roughly"
$1,504 per case. 59 While the SJT may present an attractive success rateassuming "success" is measured by increased settlements and reduced juror
costs-compelled compliance requires an inquiry into the competing rights

and powers involved. Part II will briefly examine the litigant's right of
access to the federal courts. Part III will then consider the sources of power

by which the federal judiciary might implement ADR procedures.
II.

THE LITIGANT'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO FEDERAL COURT

There are two basic theories under which a litigant might assert a right

of access to the federal courts. The first is that one or more provisions of
the Constitution confer, explicitly or implicitly, a right of access upon the
litigant. 60 A second and somewhat related theory is that district courts,
having been created pursuant to Congress' article III power to establish

inferior courts, 6' cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over legitimate federal
62
claims.

57. Id. The parties, however, may elect to have a binding summary jury trial verdict. See
Negin v. City of Mentor, 601 F. Supp. 1502 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
58. Lambros, supra note 2, at 473.
59. Id. But see Posner, supra note 47. Judge Posner questions whether there is empirical
evidence sufficient to support the proposition that the SJT and similar forms of ADR increase
judicial efficiency (i.e., by superior, or more frequent, settlements, and a resulting reduction
in the number of jury trials). Id. at 382. Moreover, because the SJT uses jurors who must be
paid at the same rate as regular federal jurors, the government may, in effect, be put in the
position of subsidizing the device. This leads Judge Posner to ask: "Can a public subsidy of
the settlement process be justified?" Id. at 372.
60. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
61. Article III provides:
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish....
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ....
U.S. CoNsT. art. III,

§§

1, 2.

62. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
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In Ryland v. Shapiro,63 the Fifth Circuit observed that "[the right of

access to the courts is basic to our system of government, and it is well
established today that it is one of the fundamental rights protected by the

Constitution. " 64 While it is broadly assumed that the Constitution guarantees

access to some court, 65 it is not clear whether the right identified by the
6
Ryland court is the right of access to the federal court.

Where a litigant's claim, assuming it meets the basic jurisdictional requirements, 67 involves fundamental constitutional or federal questions, a
federal court should properly be considered the appropriate forum. 6 The
litigant's right of access would appear to be protected under the Constitution

by virtue of a catalogue of rights embodied in the first amendment, and

69
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.

63. 708 F.2d 967 (5th Cir. 1983).
64. Id. at 971.
65. G. GUNT-ER, CONSTTTONAL LAW 51 n.6 (11th ed. 1985).
66. In Ryland, plaintiffs alleged that a state cover-up in the death of their daughter deprived
them of a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs argued that the alleged cover-up denied them
access to the state courts to litigate their tort claim, and this denial of access violated their
civil rights under § 1983 of the United States Code. The district court disagreed and dismissed
plaintiffs' claim, reasoning that depriving the plaintiffs of access to state court "did not invade
a private substantive or procedural legally protected interest guaranteed by statutes and
constitution of the United States." Ryland, 708 F.2d at 970. The Fifth Circuit reversed,
holding that such a deprivation was both a substantive and procedural violation of rights
embodied in the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, the right to petition under the
first amendment, and the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
While the Fifth Circuit did not expressly limit the "right of access" to state courts-the
plain language of the opinion refers only to "courts" generally-a contextual reading of the
opinion suggests that the court was referring to state courts. Much of the court's reasoning,
however, would apply to a litigant's claim of access to the federal courts. Specifically, the
court's due process analysis would seem to apply to claims that arise only by virtue of federal
statute because "it is widely assumed that under some circumstances due process does require
access to a court." G. GUNTHnR, supra note 65, at 51 n.6. For example, if a litigant has a
property interest in a claim, as the Ryland court suggests, and that claim is created under
federal (but not state) law, then to deny that litigant access to federal court (a court that is
presumably familiar with federal statutes, and experienced in interpreting them) would be a
due process violation. Similarly, the Ryland court's equal protection and first amendment
analysis would apply where the asserted claim is one created by federal statute, and where
federal courts previously have recognized federal jurisdiction in cases involving other litigants
asserting a similar claim.

67. This assumes that the litigant's claim is colorable and involves a case or controversy
sufficient to satisfy the basic ripeness and mootness requirements of article III.
68. See infra note 69.
69. Courts generally find a right of access to the federal courts where the claim asserted
implicates a fundamental constitutional right, or where the Congress has expressly created a
federal right. See Shaw v. Neece, 727 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir.) ("Clearly, access to the courts
of the United States is a guaranteed constitutional right." (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 976 (1984). The federal courts, however, are reluctant to declare that there is an
unconditional right to litigate in federal court. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,
461 U.S. 731, 743 (1983), where-the Court recognized a first amendment right of access to
the federal courts to petition the government for redress of grievances, but concluded that
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while not absolute, guarantees the

right to a jury trial in all actions to enforce rights and remedies traditionally
enforced at common law. 7' Together, these constitutional provisions appear
to safeguard the right of access to a federal court, at least where the litigant
asserts a valid federal or constitutional claim.
In addition, a litigant's right of access to the federal courts can also be
traced to article III of the Constitution. This analysis involves an interpretation of the extent to which a district court may decline jurisdiction validly
conferred by Congress pursuant to article III. The question of whether

Congress may restrict or eliminate lower court access has been the subject

of ongoing debate.7 2 Professor Lawrence Sager argues that the guarantees

there is no such right to bring frivolous lawsuits: "The First Amendment interests involved in
private litigation-compensation for violated rights and interests, the psychological benefits of
vindication, the public airing of disputed facts-are not advanced when the litigation is based
on ... knowingly frivolous claims." (footnote and citations omitted); see also Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980), where the Court questioned authority for the proposition
"that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to
litigate that right in a federal district court, regardless of the legal posture in which the federal
claim arises." (no right to relitigate in federal court an issue already decided in state court).
Instead, courts will look to the nature of the claim asserted to find the constitutional source
of the right. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (due process clause construed
as providing prisoners with meaningful access to the courts); California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (first amendment, which guarantees right to petition
government, includes right of access to courts); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779, 785 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("The scope of such a right [to access the district court] depends in part on the nature
of the suit.").
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court held that a litigant has a right of
access to the federal courts in a civil rights action under § 1983 of the United States Code.
"The right of access to the courts, upon which [Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969)] was
premised, is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be denied the
opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental
constitutional rights." Id. at 579 (legal assistance to prisoners prosecuting civil rights claims).
70. The seventh amendment to the Constitution states: "In Suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
71. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (seventh amendment guarantee, which
preserves the litigant's right to a jury trial in suits at common law, depends on the nature of
the issue to be tried and includes the right to a jury trial in a shareholder's derivative action);
Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363 (1974). The seventh amendment, however, is
generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings where the factfinder possesses a particular
expertise that makes jury determination inappropriate. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974);
see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

72. Compare Eisenberg, CongressionalAuthority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YAL L.J. 498, 532-33 (1974) (arguing that the district court, or some form of
lower federal court, "is constitutionally required" both to enforce the mandates of the Supreme
Court, especially in progressive areas such as civil rights, and to ensure the correct interpretation

of the Constitution given the impossibility of Supreme Court review of all state decisions
involving federal issues) and Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the FederalCourts, 95 HA~v. L. REv. 17, 61-75 (1981)
(article III requires that some federal forum must be available for the enforcement of federal
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of judicial independence and competence found in article III evidence an

"inherent" requirement that a federal forum be available for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights, 73 and that Congress cannot eliminate
lower federal courts if the effect is to deny litigants access to defend such
rights.7 4 If Congress is limited in its ability to restrict lower federal court

jurisdiction, as Professor Sager suggests, then a similar limitation should
apply to the district courts. In other words, if article III limits the ability
of Congress to restrict access to the district courts which it created, then

the district courts can have no greater restrictive power to limit their own
jurisdiction. Once Congress has conferred federal jurisdiction through the
creation of a federal cause of action, a federal court must recognize its
duty to hear the case.7
III.

SOURCES OF JUDICIAL POWER TO COMPEL ADR

Judicial power to compel compliance with innovative ADR procedures
does not flow directly from the Constitution. Rather, the power to implement such procedures stems from three possible sources: (1) local district

constitutional rights) with Gunther, CongressionalPower to CurtailFederal Jurisdiction:An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 SAN. L. RPv. 895, 912 (1984) ("difficult to
argue that lower federal courts must be available to adjudicate federal claims") and Redish,
ConstitutionalLimitations on CongressionalPower to ControlFederalJurisdiction:A Reaction
to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 143 (1982) (disagreeing with Professor Sager's interpretation of article III finding a limitation on the power of Congress to curtail lower court
jurisdiction).
73. See Sager, supra note 72, at 61-68.
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). In Cohens, Chief Justice
Marshall stated that the federal judiciary could not decline jurisdiction once it is validly
conferred by Congress:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but it
is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should ....
We have no more
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that
which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Id. at 404; see also England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964), where the Court held that a litigant who properly invokes federal statutory jurisdiction
cannot be compelled to submit to state court jurisdiction:
Such a result would be at war with the unqualified terms in which Congress,
pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred specific categories of
jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and with the principle that. . . "it is [the
federal court's] duty to take such jurisdiction.... The right of a party plaintiff
to choose a Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly denied."
Id. at 415 (quoting Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (emphasis added)).
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argues that "it is essential to have federal courts available to
hear constitutional claims and that litigants raising constitutional claims should be able to
choose whether to proceed in federal or state court." Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State
Courts, and the Constitution:A Rejoinder to Professor Redish, 36 UCLA L. R-v. 369, 369
(1988).
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court rules; 76 (2) the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;" 7 or (3) the trial
7
judge's "inherent" powers to manage and control the docket.
Critics argue that the latter two source theories condone sporadic judicial
activism in settlement negotiations, a practice heretofore prohibited. 79 Moreover, critics argue that, irrespective of the source, such power is necessarily
subservient to the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act, both of which
limit the capacity of the federal courts to alter existing substantive legal
rights through procedure. 80 This Note will argue that mandatory, ad hoc
ADR procedures cannot be justified under either the Federal Rules or the
vague "inherent powers" doctrine. The next section will review the basic
constitutional restraints on procedural innovation. It is followed by a section
discussing the scope of the Federal Rules and a section examining the status
of the inherent powers doctrine.

A.

ConstitutionalLimitations

Article III of the Constitution explicitly grants Congress the power to
regulate the review of controversies, s' In turn, Congress, by enacting section
2072 of the Rules Enabling Act,82 has delegated this power by authorizing

76, Under the Federal Rules, local district courts may enact procedural rules not inconsistent
with the Federal Rules or article III of the Constitution. FED, R. Civ. P. 83,
77. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text, Proponents of the utilization of such ad
hoc ADR procedures argue that the authority to require compliance is implicit in the Federal
Rules. Most commonly, this power is found to emanate from an aggregation of Rules 1, 16
and 83. The ambiguous power to facilitate settlement under Rule 16 is frequently cited as the
basis for this argument. See infra notes 87-116 and accompanying text. Specifically, proponents
urge that the language of FAD. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) ("may consider and take action with respect
to . . . the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute") invites discretionary implementation,
78. See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text, The "inherent" power of the district
court to control its docket was explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court in Link v. Wabash
R.R. Co.,- 370 U.S. 626 (1962),
79. See Oesterle, supra note 26, at 7; see also Resnik, supra notes 6 & 9.
80, See Maatman, supra note 47, at 473-74.
81. U.S. CosT, art. III, § 2, This section provides, in relevant part:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ... to Controversies between
two or more States;-between a State and Citizers of another State;-between
Citizens of different States .
[In all such cases], the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both
as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
Congress shall make,
Id.
82. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The Rules Enabling Act states:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the
district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, including
admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and procedure
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the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the

federal courts. The Act states, however, that the Court may not promulgate
-8
rules that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ....
The Court, by virtue of the authority vested in it by the Act, has developed
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to ensure that the litigant's constitu-

tional rights under article III and the seventh amendment are protected.
The Federal Rules, however, "cannot avoid the congressional limit on
affecting substantive rights." 4 While the line distinguishing substance from
procedure may be unclear, 5 the Federal Rules must not encroach upon the
careful balance between judicial efficiency and litigant rights: "the rights
of litigants cannot be altered or compromised in the guise of regulating
procedure."

B.

6

The Federal Rules as Judicial Justificationfor ADR

When a federal judge offers the Rules as warrant for his
intervention, he is likely to merge several rules, the combination of
which justifies his conduct. Specifically, Rule 1,87 Rule 16(c)18 and Rule
in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of the Tax
Court of the United States and for the judicial review or enforcement of orders
of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Maatman, supra note 47, at 474.
85. "The distinction between substance and procedure is often unclear. Rules that may be
classified as procedural may also bear directly on the substantive rights of litigants." Id. (citing
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)). The difficulty in distinguishing substantive from
procedural rights arises because the two become blurred when a "procedural" rule affects
substance. What are thought to be fundamental rights-access to the federal courts, uniform
treatment, and the even, unbiased application of the laws of the United States-are, in a
sense, both procedural and substantive because procedural restrictions may limit these rights.
"Ultimately, procedure and substance cannot be divorced: no procedural decision can be
completely 'neutral' in the sense that it does not affect substance." Elliott, supra note 29, at
325.
86. Maatman, supra note 47, at 474.
87. Rule 1 decrees that federal judges shall apply the Federal Rules "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
88. The declared objective of Rule 16 is to foster efficient settlement through the use of
pretrial discovery and planning. Rule 16(c) provides, in relevant part:
The participants at any conference under this rule may consider and take action
with respect to ..
(7) the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve
the dispute;

FED.

(10) the need for adopting special procedures for managing potentially difficult
or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult
legal questions, or unusual proof problems; and
(11) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
R. CIrv. P. 16(c).
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3989 are said to expressly provide the district court judge with the power to
manage the court docket at the pretrial stage. 9° The linchpin of this combined

power is Rule 16. Invoking Rule 16 as justification for the SJT assumes
that the desire to avoid trial is a legitimate goal of pretrial procedure. Here,
the judge acts as a case manager, 9' employing the "extrajudicial powers"
contemplated by Rule 1692 to encourage settlement. Danger lies, however,
where encouragement gives way to coercion. 93
Few would argue that the federal judge must have the necessary tools to

control his docket. The Federal Rules, which are the "product of a careful
process of study and reflection ... where the Supreme Court and the
Congress, acting together, have addressed the appropriate balance between
94

the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant,''
attempt to provide such a docket-control tool in Rule

16. 95

This rule,

however, is limited in its ability to authorize mandatory procedures not
contemplated by the Rules.

In Lockhart v. Patel,96 the court addressed its authority to order parties

and their insurers to attend a settlement conference. The court, interpreting

the propriety of such an action under Rule 16, stated that the drafters of
the Rule "knew of the docket pressures to which our courts are subject,
and knew that to process 400 cases you have to settle at least 350. That is

why they encouraged 'forceful judicial management,' which is the only
means of settling a high percentage of cases." 97 The court concluded that

89. Applied by analogy, this Rule states that "[in all actions not triable of right by a jury

the court upon motion or of its own initiative may try any issue with an advisory jury." FED.
R. Cry. P. 39(c).
90. Although analyzed as independent justification for ADR implementation, the Rules are
frequently combined with the inherent power (or "supervisory power") doctrine. See generally
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989).
91. See Peckham, supra note 29, at 770. Judge Peckham, the Chief District Court Judge
for the Northern District of California, observed that "until very recently most appellate courts
held the view that district courts had virtually unfettered discretion to enact and enforce
pretrial rules, regulations, and procedures, and considered that this discretion was supported
by broad sanctioning powers." Id. at 790. While Judge Peckham's article pre-dates the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules, his observation is worth note because it aptly illustrates
judicial recognition of the competing tensions a judge encounters when openly advocating
settlement.
92. See supra note 88.
93. It is clear that federal judges may not coerce settlement. See infra text accompanying
note 114; infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text. The line between encouragement and
coercion, however, is blurred, and there may be a temptation to encourage settlement too
zealously. "Judges are human and humans tend to abuse power when they have it; Rule 16
is surely no exception." Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1969, 1995 (1989).
94. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1987).
95. When combined with the speed and efficiency mandate of Rule 1, Rule 16 logically
invests in the trial judge the ability to participate in pretrial to whatever degree the judge feels
necessary to speed the lawsuit to its conclusion.
96. 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
97. Id. at 47.
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a trial judge may order the attendance of party representatives with the
ability to settle because without such attendance the settlement conference
would be a wasted exercise. 9 Implicit in the court's reasoning was the
absence of undue burdens on the parties. The travel cost incurred in
attending the conference was offset by the potential savings available if a
satisfactory settlement was realized. Of course, the court stated, an actual
settlement could not be ordered, but a trial judge could require a party "to
make reasonable efforts, including attending a settlement conference with
an open mind." 99
Recently, an en banc panel of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit issued a similar ruling in G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat
Corp.1°° In a six to five majority opinion (with five separate dissenting
opinions), the G. Heileman court reversed an earlier panel that had restricted
the power of a district court to require the appearance of a represented
party (as opposed to a represented party's attorney) at a settlement conference. In deciding that a district court may compel such attendance, the G.
Heileman court held that "Rule 16 does not limit, but rather is enhanced
by, the inherent authority of federal courts to order litigants ... to attend
pretrial conferences." 101
The G. Heileman court, in interpreting Rule 16(a)(5),10 2 addressed three
issues. First, the court considered whether the Rule's explicit language (which
includes only a "represented party's attorney or an unrepresented party")
foreclosed the forced attendance of a party represented by counsel. Noting
that a judge may not coerce settlement, the court read the language of Rule
16 to be silent with respect to represented litigants. This silence did not
indicate an exclusion of power.10 3
Second, the court considered whether such attendance could be mandated,
notwithstanding the textual silence of the Rule, under the inherent power
of the court to relieve docket pressures. The court held that the inherent
power of the trial court to manage litigation conferred upon the court
power to require the represented party's attendance at settlement conferences.1 4
Third, the court considered whether such a broad interpretation of inherent judicial authority would invest in the trial court a power that

98. Id.; see In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974) (similar conclusion reached,
though decision pre-dates 1983 Federal Rules amendments).
99. Lockhart, 115 F.R.D. at 47; see Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
100. 107 F.R.D. 275 (W.D. Wis. 1985), rev'd, 848 F.2d 1415 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 871
F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
101. 871 F.2d at 656.
102. Rule 16(a) states: "(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court may
in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to appear
before it for a conference ... ." FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a).
103. G. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 651-52.
104. Id. at 652.
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contravened the Federal Rule's careful balance of interests, resulting in the
encouragement of what the dissent termed "judicial high-handedness."'' 0 5
Conceding that "inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, [and] must be exercised with restraint and discretion,"'06 the court
nonetheless concluded that ordering a represented party's attendance at a
settlement conference was "inharmony" with Rule 16, and, therefore,
represented only an effort to "preserve the efficiency, and more importantly
'07
the integrity, of the judicial process."'

A reading of the five dissenting opinions reveals the dilemma that divided
the G. Heileman court. 08 The dissenting judges'01 focused on the express
language of Rule 16. More importantly, they focused on the consequences

of a broad interpretation that finds power where hone explicitly exists." 0
Because the litigant has no duty to "negotiate [for settlement] 'in good
faith,""" forced party attendance at a settlement conference would be
useless." 2 Moreover, to ascribe such a power would violate the Rules
Enabling Act,"' and would significantly undermine a primary purpose of
the Federal Rules:
We may express in grandiose terms all sorts of theory and postulation
about being careful not to influence, intimidate and/or coerce a settlement, but under the pressure that our trial judges experience today from
their ever-burgeoning caseloads, we would be foolhardy not to anticipate
.... [t]he appearance of partiality and impropriety [that] must be

105. Id. at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 654 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 US. 752, 764 (1980)).
107. Id. at 652.
108, In G. Heileman, the Seventh Circuit clearly recognized the tension between the need
for judicial efficiency and the potential erosion of the litigant's substantive rights precipitated
by an expansive interpretation of the Federal Rules. An analysis of the dissenting opinions is
necessary for two reasons. First, the G. Heileman decision offers a thorough analysis of the
relationship between the Federal Rules and the inherent powers doctrine, and an understanding
of the dissenters' position clarifies this relationship. Second, the en banc decision was narrowly
decided (six to five) in favor of a broader interpretation of judicial power. This fact illustrates
the controversy surrounding such interpretations of power.
109. The five dissenting judges were: Posner, Coffey, Easterbrook, Ripple and Manion,
Circuit Judges.
110. G. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting); id. at 658-60 (Coffey, J.,
dissenting); id. at 666-67 (Manion, J., dissenting). Support for the dissenting judges' position
can be found in Wyeth Laboratories v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Kan., 57
U.S.L.W. 2047 (10th Cir. 1988). In Wyeth, the Tenth Circuit held that a federal district court
lacked the power to establish a "litigation library" for the collection of pleadings, discovery
material, trial exhibits and other material used in litigation. The court stated: "If an act can
be performed by a district court, it is because it was permitted and not because it was not
prohibited by Congress. Federal courts operate only in the presence rather than in the absence
of statutory authority." Id. at 2047.
111. G. Hieleman, 871 F.2d at 664 (Posner, J., dissenting) (citing Advisory Committee
Comment to FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 665 (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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avoided at all lengths if our nation is to continue to show respect for
its judicial judgments."1

The G, Heileman decision illustrates the judicial discord and tension that
result when facets of the settlement stage become compulsory,' 5 Because
the dimensions of the pretrial Rule are ambiguous, district court judges are
left to create and define their own limitations. Discerning the precise point
when self-imposed limits exceed the scope of the Rules is difficult. The only
pattern is that Rule 16 authority is apparently usurped when a pretrial
procedure clearly conflicts with the careful balance of the Rules, or attempts
6
to coerce settlement.1
The 0. Heileman majority touched only briefly on the doctrine of inherent
powers, and then only as support for an expansive interpretation of Rule
16. As the next section will discuss, however, the inherent power of the
court is often offered as an independent source of authority for mandating
ADR,
C.

The Inherent Power of the Court

The second justification commonly offered for ad hoe settlement procedures is the inherent power of the court to manage various aspects of the
litigation process. The Supreme Court recognized inherent power in Link
v. Wabash Railroad Co.," 7 when it held that the Federal Rules did not
restrict the inherent power of a district court to dismiss dormant lawsuits.
The Court stated that:
It]he authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution
has generally been considered an "inherent power," governed not by

rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition

of cases."'
Seizing on this language in Link, courts have recognized inherent powers
beyond sua sponte dismissal for want of prosecution. 19 Since Link, a number
of courts have assumed that the trial court's inherent power extends to a
vast array of pretrial procedures, including compliance with mandatory

114, Id. at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
115. See also Identiseal Corp. v. Positive Identification Sys., 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir.
1977) (court cannot force a party to engage in discovery); J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v.

Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (court cannot
compel parties to stipulate to facts).
116, See Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887; Kothe, 771 F.2d at 669; Lockhart, 115 F.R.D. at 47.
117. 370 U.S, 626 (1962).
118. Id. at 630-31.
119. Judge Robert Peckham argues that Link "initially set the tone for the extremely
deferential attitude of the appellate courts toward the district courts' authority to use pretrial

procedures," Peckham, supra note 29, at 790.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:965

settlement procedures. Lower courts have decided that the district court has

the inherent authority to require attendance at settlement conferences,' 20 to
assess pretrial sanctions, 21 to adopt novel means of controlling cases during
pretrial'2 and to regulate the litigation before it.'2 Lower courts have
disagreed, however, over the extent to which inherent power authorizes the
imposition of mandatory settlement-inducing procedures
such as the sum26
mary jury trial,'2 mediation,'2 and arbitration.
Some lower courts have recognized limits to the inherent powers doctrine.

While a district court's power to control its docket is generally respected,
the court may not act in a manner that interferes with protected constitutional rights, 27 it may not undercut the potency of discovery rulesm nor

120. See G. Heileman, 848 F.2d at 1415; In re LaMarre, 494 F.2d at 753; Lockhart, 115
F.R.D. at 44.
121. See Matter of Sanction of Baker, 744 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1984) (pretrial sanctions
have always been within the inherent power of the courts to manage their affairs as an
independent branch of government); J. M. Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich, 93 F.R.D.
338 (D.C. Conn. 1981) (federal trial court possesses inherent power to control disposition of
cases before it, including the authority to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation
practices). But see Harris v. Callwood, 844 F.2d 1254 (6th Cir. 1988) (dismissal of plaintiff's
suit for failure to appear at pretrial conference excessive); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757
F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (imposition of monetary sanction on attorney for misconduct without
affording attorney prior notice and opportunity to be heard violates due process).
122. See Lockhart, 115 F.R.D. at 47 (discretion of court to manage docket must be protected
by according the court the ability to adopt novel and imaginative means of control). But see
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884.
123. See, e.g., Van Bronkhorst v. Safeco Corp., 529 F.2d 943 (9th Cir. 1976) (district court
has broad and inherent power to regulate litigation before it); Turner v. American Bar Ass'n,
407 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 625 (federal judge has inherent power to
govern and control litigation before him); see also Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say.
& Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc) (court has inherent power to
establish standards of litigation conduct).
124. See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1989),
appeal sub nom. pending (courts have the power to conduct SJT under either Rule 16, or as
a matter of the court's inherent power to manage its cases); Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988) (inherent power allows
imposition of mandatory SJT); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988)
(inherent power allows imposition of mandatory SJT); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119
F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (inherent power allows imposition of mandatory SJT). But see
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884.
125. See Tiedel v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 118 F.R.D. 54 (W.D. Mich. 1987), rev'd, 865 F.2d
88 (6th Cir. 1988) (district court lacks the power to promote settlement by requiring a party
who rejects a mediator's proposal to pay the prevailing side's attorney's fees).
126. See generally supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
127. See Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights, Etc., 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982)
(district court power to fashion remedy is broad, but cannot interfere with constitutional
rights).
128. See Strandell, 838 F.2d at 884; Union City Barge Line, Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp.,
823 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1987) (district court power cannot undercut discovery control measures,
including a rule mandating the holding of a discovery conference upon the motion of one of
the parties).
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may it impinge upon the Federal Rules. 2 9
In Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 130 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit surveyed the history of the inherent powers doctrine, and described
the concept as "nebulous, and its bounds as 'shadowy.' . . definitional
problems regarding inherent power [ ] have bedeviled commentators for
131 The Fourth Circuit found three primary justifications for
years ....
invoking inherent power, 3 2 but concluded that regardless of which justification a court adopts, the court may not act to the derogation of a party's
due process rights.13 1 Similarly, in Landau & Cleary, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 3 4 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, declining to
define the doctrine's precise contours, flatly stated: "inherent authority...
may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
35
Civil Procedure."'
Somewhere within a court's inherent power there exist limitations. These
limitations, though vague, would appear to involve situations where such
authority would conflict with the Federal Rules. 13 6 This Note will next
discuss the practical problems resulting from the lack of coherent limits on
judicial power.
IV.

UNRESTRAINED JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT: JUDGES OR MANAGERS?

A.

JudicialActivism in the Settlement Process

The purpose of each ADR technique is to promote settlement. When
voluntary, such procedures represent a meaningful and effective alternative
to the high cost of traditional litigation. 137 These ADR procedures, however,
129. See McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393 (4th Cir. 1976) (local rule that was inconsistent
with Federal Rule 16 held invalid).
130. 757 F.2d 557, 558 (3d Cir. 1985).
131. Id. at 561.
132. The court stated that the doctrine is employed under three general pretenses: (1) judicial
powers pursuant to article III; (2) the nature of the court; and (3) necessity in the sense of
being practical or useful. Id. at 562-63.
133. Id. at 570-71.
134. 867 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1989).
135. Id. at 1002. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988) (inherent
supervisory power does not permit district court to dismiss criminal indictment for error in
grand jury proceedings where such action would contravene "harmless error" rule of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)).
136. Cf. G. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 648.
137. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text. The rules relating to discovery are an
obvious source of potential abuse. Much of the discovery process may be a needless exercise
designed to engage the opposition in a flood of "paper wars." Another example is the
exhaustive appeals process. While purporting to correct trial errors, the process may actually
negate the usefulness of a trial when judgments are reversed on technical, quasi-harmless, or
ancillary grounds irrelevant to the central issues of the dispute. Moreover, the appellate process
may undercut the finality of judgment when a losing party pursues a borderline-frivolous claim
to ultimate exhaustion-i.e., the finality of a jury verdict is lost when the loser is able to
postpone paying damages pending the outcome of an appeal.
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should not completely supplant trials. When ADR procedures are mandatory, litigants may be deprived of those guarantees that underpin the judicial
system, Discovery protections, the ability to proceed to trial, and the
resulting fairness of that trial may all be destroyed. Mandatory ADR may
force litigants to endure a costly procedure implemented on an ad hoc basis
with minimal benefit.
Courts and commentators have struggled to articulate the extent to which
a trial judge may intervene in the settlement process.13 1 It is clear that a
judge may not "club" the parties into an involuntary compromise of the
litigation. 39 Judicial power, whether inherent or rooted in Rule 16, is limited
in its capacity to force settlement upon unwilling litigants.' 40 As one court
defined the limitation: "[T]he horses may be led to water. Whether they
drink is up to them.' 41 Yet aside from this obvious restriction on extreme
activism, there are no coherent restraints on judicial attempts to "lead" the
litigants to settlement.
Professor Marc Galanter asserts that the "[a]ctive promotion of settlements is now unmistakably the 'established' position in the federal judiciary. 1 42 Echoing this observation, Judge Robert Peckham of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, reacting to the
impact of the increased caseload on judicial management, writes: "While
few judges wish to force unwilling parties to settle, many judges believe
that the promotion of informed and fair settlements is one of the most
important aims of pretrial management," 143 Judge Peckham's view, however,
begs the question-what is a "fair" settlement? More importantly, who
decides, the judge or the litigant? This Note will argue that a judge who
zealously pursues settlement to relieve his docket becomes more "case
manager" than judge. In this role, the judge who actively advocates what

138. See Resnik, supra note 9 at 496 ("At a more theoretical level, the Rules fail to address
what role, if any, judges should play in shaping settlements and how judges should assess the
adequacy of the compromises reached."). Compare Peckham, supra note 23, at 253 (advocating
the need for judicial participation) with Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
139. See Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that Federal Rule 16 was
not designed as a means for clubbing the parties, or one of them, into an involuntary
compromise of the litigation).
140. See generally Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986) (trial judge lacks the authority to
"require the parties to accept a settlement to which they had not agreed"); In re LaMarre,

494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974) (due process constraints of the Constitution upon the inherent

powers of the trial judge restrict his power to compel settlement of which one party does not
approve); Abney v. Patten, 696 F. Supp. 567, 568 (W.D. Okla. 1987) ("Obviously the Rule
[16] does not permit compelled settlements, nor even the imposition of settlement negotiations
on unwilling litigants.").
141. Abney, 696 F. Supp. at 568.
142. Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JuDICATURE
257, 261 (1986). Professor Galanter notes, "Judges who are activists on this matter are invited
to give seminars to new judges; their views are broadcast by publication in Federal Rules
Decisions and disseminated in booklets by the Federal Judicial Center." Id. at 261.
143. Peckham, supra note 29, at 773.
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he thinks is a fair settlement threatens the independent prerogative of the
litigant to decide on what terms she will accept compromise, if at all.
B.

Coerced Settlement: The Effect on Procedural
and Substantive Rights

Professor Judith Resnik has adamantly warned of the potential for abuse
44
when trial judges assume too much control over the settlement process.'
Terming these jurists "managerial judges,"' 4 Resnik argues that they "have
begun to perceive themselves as being in the business of settlement as much
as (sometimes more than) in the business of adjudication.'"4 While proponents of managerial judging are confident that "informal exercises of
power can be used wisely as well as effectively,"'' 47 Resnik perceptively
argues that court discretion may threaten substantive and procedural guar41
antees.
Managerial judging principally threatens access to justice. Burdensome
settlement procedures inevitably obstruct, or even eliminate, the litigant's
50
ability to proceed to trial. 149 Settlement is not a prerequisite to trial. If
the litigant must engage in settlement negotiations,' 5' then she is detoured
from her normal litigation course. Even if de jure access is unmolested
(e.g., when the ADR purports to be nonbinding), de facto access may be
limited if the litigant's substantive and procedural rights become illusory.
First, the transformation from judge to manager may significantly hamper
judicial objectivity. 52 As the judge becomes increasingly involved in the

144. See Resnik, supra notes 6 & 9.
145. Resnik, supra note 9, at 497.
146. Id. at 528.
147. Id. at 544.
148. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
149. "Are judges who require settlement negotiations implementing a societal decision that
we no longer offer trial-as-of-right to any litigant who so desires and who has the resources
and stamina to insist upon one?" Resnik, supra note 9, at 550.
150. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 657-58 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Posner, J., dissenting).
151. In light of G. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 648, the litigant may be compelled to attend a
pre-trial settlement conference to discuss the possibility of settlement. This is not to say,
however, that the litigant must engage in settlement negotiations. See Strandell v. Jackson
County, 838 F.2d 884, 887 (7th Cir, 1987).
152. See Resnik, supra note 6, at 427; see also Oesterle, supra note 26, at 11 (questioning
whether activist judges can cleanse their minds of inadmissable information learned during
pretrial, and noting the possible impact on trial in light of the judge's considerable influence
over juries); Note, supra note 26, at 182 ("judge who coerces parties into a settlement injects
into trial a consideration outside the merits of the case"). But see Fox, Settlement: Helping
the Lawyers to Fulfill Their Responsibility, 53 F.R.D, 129 (1971) (threat of impartiality of the
managerial judge more theoretical than real).
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case, he may later find it difficult to ignore impressions or biases.'

For

example, the judge may develop feelings of friendship or loyalty that may
later bias his judgment.154 This danger of bias differs from that posed during
normal motion practice because pre-trial litigation rarely involves a presentation of all the facts in the case (thus, a judge is unlikely to make an
early determination of the merits), nor does it require sustained contact
with the parties.155 Similarly, some impressions that the judge forms may
56
be based on a lawyer's inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading statements.

Second, appellate review of legal determinations infected by inappropriate
judicial settlement conduct becomes virtually impossible because the trial

record will not reflect evidence improperly received and considered during
the settlement stages.'

7

Nor will any abuse of discretion at the settlement

stage be discernible because much of the negotiation takes place off the
record. Thus, it becomes difficult to supervise and constrain the trial judge's
unfettered use of power. 58

Third, given the inclination of some judges to influence their colleagues
by developing managerial innovations, the judge may subconsciously invest
an unhealthy interest in the outcome, or aggregate outcomes, of a particular
settlement procedure. 159 It is possible that a particular judge might influence

the result of a procedure to improve the success of his invention.

153. The inevitable counter-argument is that this dilemma can be avoided by appointing a
different judge for settlement and trial; a practice utilized in many state courts (e.g., California).
This solution, however, undercuts the efficacy of judicial management because two judges are
now required to handle each case instead of one.
154. Professor Resnik argues that the frequent contact between judge and lawyer that
necessarily occurs during settlement negotiations "may become occasions for the development
of intense feelings-admiration, friendship, or antipathy. Therefore, management becomes a
fertile field for the growth of personal bias." Resnik, supra note 6, at 427.
155. These elements of sustained contact leading to personal bias, supra note 152, and early
determinations of liability without a thorough factual presentation, supra note 154, raise the
issue of whether the judge should be involved in the settlement process at all. Professor David
Shapiro notes that the question of whether the judge should be significantly involved in the
settlement process is not settled:
[T]here has been a continuing debate about whether a judge who is involved in
settlement discussions should preside at the trial, or at any adjudication of an
issue on the merits ....

Is there perhaps a sufficient consensus by now to state

some sort of principle-say that in the absence of informed consent by the
parties, a judge who has become significantly involved in settlement discussions
should not ordinarily preside over the adjudication of issues on the merits?
Shapiro, supra note 93, at 1996.
156. See Resnik, supra note 6, at 425 (noting the absence of institutional factors at the
pretrial settlement stage that act to check the judge's pretrial management-factors such as a
review of the record for the veracity of assertions on which the judge makes determinations).
157. Professor Resnik notes that the conduct of the managerial judge results in "[u]nreviewable
power." Resnik, supra note 6, at 430.
158. See generally Resnik, supra note 6.
159. Judicial innovations to combat the ills of the system are encouraged, and indeed often
serve as the catalyst for procedural reform or amendment. See supra notes 12-16 and
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Fourth, litigants run a substantial risk of being treated in a disparate
manner when they encounter a particular judge that is especially settlementprone. 60 A litigant appearing before a managerial judge who is especially
creative with his interpretation of permissible judicial intervention may be
forced to endure procedures not required of similar litigants. This may
result in additional costs or possible party admissions not incurred by
litigants appearing before judges with lighter docket pressures, or judges
61
who abdicate a managerial role.
Finally, successful ADR that results in settlement fails to produce a
written opinion. Future litigants, therefore, are deprived of any precedent
on which to guide their behavior or expectations.
This is not to say that settlement is best relegated to its former covert
status. Settlement is clearly a legitimate goal of the pretrial process, and
judges should indeed encourage and facilitate voluntary discussions and
compromise. 62 It is, however, crucial that the judge not descend from his
position as an impartial administrator of justice; that he not actively coerce
the litigant into avoiding the judge's official courtroom jurisdiction. The
adversarial process should serve the litigant, and if the litigant desires to
avail herself of the process, she should be able to do so without undue
restraints.163 The next Part will examine the courts' incoherent attempts to
address such restraints.
V.

MANDATORY

ADR: THE CAsELAw

Conceptually, mandatory arbitration and mandatory summary jury trials
are very similar. Both are informal hearings before an impartial body that
renders a non-binding determination of liability prior to a "trial on the

accompanying text; see also Galanter, supra note 142 and accompanying text. Given the natural
desire to receive the accolades of one's peers, the activist judge must be careful not to become
too self-interested in the results of his innovation. More than one scientist has been known to
conform the experiment to fit the hypothesis.
160. "More troublesome than these surprising calculations of judicial productivity, however,
is the prospect that settling courts dispense a brand of justice that is inferior to that dispensed
by courts adhering to the conservative tradition." Oesterle, supra note 26, at 10.
161. This potential for disparate treatment is especially troublesome because there is no
compelling reason for the disparity. There is little empirical evidence to suggest that active
promotion of settlements produces more settlements, produces superior settlements, or even
makes courts more productive. Galanter, The FederalRules and the Quality of Settlements:
A Comment on Rosenberg's, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure in Action, 137 U. PA. L.
RE,. 2231, 2233-34 (1989).
162. The legitimacy of settlement, however, should not be predicated solely on its purported
ability to lighten the judicial docket. One commentator notes that the empirical data from
1977-1981 indicate that courts exerting more pressure to settle do not necessarily dispose of
more cases per judge than those courts expending less effort on settlement. See Oesterle, supra
note 26, at 9 ("data suggest that extensive court involvement in civil case settlement does not
help clear crowded dockets").
163. See Resnik, supra note 6, at 431.
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merits." Both have as their express purpose the desire to encourage settlement and thereby avoid litigation. Finally, both purport to leave unrestricted
the litigant's ability to proceed to a full trial "on the merits" should the
advisory opinion prove unsatisfactory and settlement be not reached. There
are, however, several procedural and substantive factors that distinguish
mandatory arbitration from ad hoc ADR procedures such as the SJT, and
these significant differences make mandatory arbitration a far more palatable
alternative.
A.

Mandatory Arbitration Distinguished

The distinction between substantive and procedural rights is often obscure.164 In Kinbrough v. Holiday Inn, 65 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that "[a] change in the right
to jury trial is substantive where there is a substantial likelihood that the
outcome of the trial would be influenced by the change and where no
significant advantage accrues to the government by virtue of the innovation." 16 The Kimbrough court, however, concluded that compulsory, nonbinding arbitration as a condition precedent to trial did not violate a
litigant's substantive right to a jury trial.167
Dismissing the contention that a local arbitration rule violated the Federal
Rules, the fourteenth amendment or the seventh amendment to the Constitution, the court emphasized that arbitration is the product of local rules
clearly authorized under the Federal Rules.168 Further, "arbitration ...
greatly aids the efficiency of the trial system yet does not influence the
outcome of the final verdict for any individual."' 6 9 Underpinning the court's
reasoning were several factors, including the litigant's ability to demand a
trial de novo, the substantial savings of discovery resources, the ability of
the panel to render a fair result, the limited nature of the procedure, and
the fact that the "[1litigants [had] the opportunity to test the validity of
their claims very shortly after [filing].' 170 In sum, the benefits of providing
an efficient alternative for dispute resolution outweighed any incidental
burdens to the litigant. A number of federal courts have followed this
declaration of mandatory arbitration's constitutionality.' 7,

164. See Elliott, supra note 29, at 325-26; see also supra note 85.
165. 478 F. Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
166. Id. at 569 (interpreting the Supreme Court's directive in Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S.

223 (1978)).
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
1983).

Id. at 571.
Id.at 572.
Id.at 569.
Id. at 571.
See, e.g., New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa.
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Given the legitimacy of mandatory arbitration, it would appear that other
mandatory settlement-inducing procedures should survive constitutional muster. There are important concerns with other procedures, 72 however, that
simply do not apply to mandatory arbitration. 73
Perhaps the most important distinguishing factor is that mandatory courtannexed arbitration provides notice to the litigants that the procedure will
apply to an entire class of disputes. 7 4 Because there is no ad hoc implementation-an unavoidable characteristic of the flexibility-driven summary

jury trial' 75-the parties are on notice, from the moment they file suit, that
they will be subject to arbitration, This allows the litigant to plan her
discovery and case preparation accordingly. There is no risk that the litigant
will conduct exhaustive discovery and motion procedure-a process that
may take several years and exact great costs in terms of money and effort-

only to be informed just prior to trial that she must undergo an unexpected
preliminary procedure.176 Court-annexed arbitration avoids such pretrial
waste by advising the litigant that she need only conduct that preparation

necessary for the arbitration hearing. If arbitration proves unsatisfactory,
then the party can engage in the necessary pretrial procedures. In contrast,
the SJT may appear without warning, and the litigant may lack the ability
77
to tailor preparation to the informality and expertise of the hearing panel.
Second, mandatory arbitration routinely refers all of a certain class of
disputes to the process. 7s This eliminates the potential for disparate treat-

172. See infra notes 173-82 and accompanying text.
173. The Supreme Court, in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568
(1985), suggests that a possible distinguishing factor is the possibility of public law being
decided by private parties. In Thbmas, the Court determined that article III of the Constitution
did not prohibit Congress from selecting binding arbitration as the mechanism for resolving
compensation disputes among participants in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act's registration scheme. Id. at 583. The Court emphasized that such a procedure did not
present the danger that private parties would decide issues of public law, and that the Act,
which would be subject to arbitration, applied to a narrow arena of disputes. Id. at 585-91;
see also Edwards, supra note 12, at 671.
174. See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 47-59 and accompanying text. There is virtually no way the litigants
can be advised early on of the possibility of mandatory SJT participation because the case
must develop sufficiently to allow both sides to intelligently negotiate for settlement. By the
time the parties have amassed enough information to assess the merits of their respective cases,
they may be very close to the actual trial date.
176. Because the SJT presentation is a narrative summation, the litigant's counsel may have
to prepare in a manner ill-suited for trial. In addition, assuming the ADR technique is
successful in achieving its goal of settlement, years of discovery and preparation may be
wasted.
177. In contrast to the jury, which lacks both education in the law and an understanding
of the necessary technical background of the dispute, the arbitration hearing panel is often
composed of expert(s) in one or both. Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 430. This allows the
litigant to refrain from amassing the extensive background facts necessary to present the
litigant's case to the jury.
178. Most commonly the litigant's monetary demand is the deciding factor. For example,
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ment of similar cases since all of the litigant class will endure the process

as a prerequisite to trial. While treatment may vary from district to districtdepending on whether the district employs mandatory arbitration-the level

district are
of offense, is greatly reduced because all litigants in a particular
79
on notice that cases in their locale will be similarly treated.

Third, mandatory arbitration does not involve the judge who will eventually preside over the trial should one of the parties elect to disregard the
arbitration decision. A separate panel renders the decision, and the judge

becomes involved only through the normal course of litigation.
over judicial prejudice, therefore, are reduced.

s0

Concerns

Finally, mandatory arbitration, unlike the SJT, is not the product of ad

hoc judicial fiat. Rather, it represents either congressional initiative or
district unity. The entire district, on either its own motion or direction from
Congress, institutes a set of procedural guidelines to be followed in each
case. These procedures are subject to comment, criticism, and review'
regarding their propensity to violate the limitations to judicial power em-

bodied in the Rules Enabling Act." 2 The "[c]ongressional concern for

the Court Reform and Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 651-658 (Law. Co-op. 1988 &
Supp. 1989), provides that any of the 10 district courts which already have established
arbitration programs may require the parties to arbitrate any case in which the relief sought
consists of less than $100,000 in damages (although individual courts may set an amount of
less than $100,000 as the mandatory cut-off). Id. § 652(a)(1)(B). In addition, certain types of
disputes (i.e., labor or certain industry disputes) are referred first to arbitration by virtue of
contractual arrangement.
179. While the possibility of disparate treatment by districts is offensive to the concept of
uniform national treatment of cases, this is tolerable in light of the probable future of the
Access to Justice Act. The Act is an experimental program. Congress apparently intends that,
once the kinks have been worked out of the system, the program will be implemented on a
national scale. Practicality demands that some variance be endured during this transition and
experimentation stage. See Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 575. In holding that compulsory
arbitration does not violate a litigant's equal protection or due process guarantees, the
Kimbrough court stated, "The local arbitration rule is a first step to develope a fast, efficient,
and inexpensive system of dispute-resolution on a national scale ....
Unfortunately, the price
of planned progress may be temporary disparity." Id. Moreover, the very existence of local
rules does not destroy national uniformity. See Keeton, supra note 3, at 859. The problem
arises when a local rule would subvert the Federal Rules, or would invest in the trial judge
the power to implement procedures on an ad hoc basis-problemns that are not present in the
Act.
180. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
181. Rule 83 requires that copies of the proposed rule be furnished to the judicial council,
the Administration Office of the United States Courts and the public. The 1985 amendment
to the Rule attempts to "enhance the local rulemaking process by requiring appropriate public
notice of proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them." Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rule 83. For criticism that the amendment does not go far enough in requiring
review by the local bar and other appropriate commentators, see 12 C. WIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDEa A. PacTcE AND PROCEDURE § 3152, at 217 (1973).
182. For a discussion of the restraints on judicial power found in the Rules Enabling Act,
see supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text. In McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 402 (4th
Cir. 1976), the court warned that "local rules are not a source of power but are instead a
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uniformity of practice in the federal courts1 8 3 is thus satisfied while allowing
the judicial experimentation envisioned by the Act. Mandatory arbitration,

therefore, will not be invoked by any particular judge on a case-by-case
basis according to a desire to alleviate his workload.
Thus, notice to the litigants, equal treatment and procedural uniformity

distinguish court-annexed arbitration from the summary jury trial. The next
section will discuss the current state of the law regarding mandatory summary jury trials, and will argue that no coherent position emerges. This will

be followed by Part VI, which will suggest that the lack of fundamental
requirements discussed above make a mandatory SJT intolerable under
current procedural principles.

B.

The Summary Jury Trial

While mandatory arbitration, uniformly implemented, can be reconciled
with the rights and protections afforded under the Rules, ad hoc implementation of the SJT cannot. A number of lower courts have approved of
the procedure, though primarily as a non-mandatory device.1s4 A survey of

manifestation of it." (court invalidated local rule requiring the parties to submit a pretrial
written statement of the controlling matters and issues or be subject to sanction, including
default). Assuming, however, that a district court does not exceed the scope of local rulemaking authority, the power to implement local rules is found in Rule 83. Rule 83 provides,
in pertinent part:
Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may from time
to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity to comment,
make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules....
In all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may
regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those
of the district in which they act.
FED. R. Civ. P. 83.

183. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 665-66 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Ripple, J., dissenting).
184. Summary jury trials have been held in an estimated sixty-five districts. See Maatman,
supra note 47, at 455 (1988). See generally Compressed Gas Corp. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 857
F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1988) (SJT held with approval); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1987) (SJT properly held under either inherent power or
Rule 16); Mui v. Wing, 822 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1987) (SJT held in child support action with
jury finding insufficient evidence to establish that plaintiff and defendant were ever married);
Erskine v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 814 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1987) (SJT held with approval
with jury returning verdict for plaintiff, directed verdict for defendant at actual trial); KemSolv, Inc. v. Deep Run Design, No. 85-6794 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist file) (SJT properly held on RICO claims as settlement device); Homeowner's Funding
Corp. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Mass. 1988) (available array of alternative
dispute resolution choices includes SJT); Smart v. Simonson, No. 80 C 3169 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
30, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (court held one day SJT resulting in verdict for
defendants, defendants motion for summary judgment later granted), aff'd, 867 F.2d 429 (7th
Cir. 1989); AMP, Inc. v. Zacharias, No. 87 C 3244 (N.D. IM.June 12, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed
library, Dist file) (SJT held with approval); Seck v. Hamrang, 657 F. Supp. 1074 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (ADR procedures available to court include SJT); Fraley v. Lake Winnepesaukah, 631
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the available case law fails to provide a coherent position on the propriety
of a mandatory SJT. The Seventh Circuit, combining analyses of both the
court's inherent power and Rule 16, has held that a mandatory SJT exceeds
the scope of judicial power.'85 District courts in Kentucky, 8 6 Minnesota'8 '
and Florida,'8 8 however, have disagreed with the Seventh Circuit and permit
a mandatory summary jury trial.
In McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc.,'8 9 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky upheld the use of a mandatory SJT as
consistent with both Rule 16 and the court's inherent powers. The court
viewed the device as "effect[ing] substantial savings of time,"' 19 though the
court conceded that "to date we have only unscientific anecdotal evidence
of the effectiveness of summary jury trials."' 9' Similarly, in both Arabian
American Oil Co. v. Scarfone 92 and Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
v. Carey-Canada, Inc.,19 district court judges upheld compulsory SJT
participation as an effective means of forcing the parties to prepare for
94
trial without abridging the litigants' substantive rights.'
In stark contrast to these decisions stands Strandell v. Jackson County,195
a decision in which the highest ranking court to address the issue rejected
the SJT precisely because of its potential to violate substantive rights. In
Strandell, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined that
neither Rule 16 nor the inherent powers doctrine permitted a district court
to "require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked from the normal course
of litigation." 1 96 Rejecting the reasoning of the district court, the Seventh
Circuit held that the potential for violating a litigant's substantive rights
F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (if parties are interested in settling the case, the court has the
power to suggest SJT); Hall v. Ashland Oil Co., 625 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Conn. 1986) (court
felt SJT would serve as effective settlement facilitating device); Carter v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., No. 83-6234, slip op. (E.D. Pa. March 7, 1986) (parties agreed to recommendation of SJT); Negin v. City of Mentor, 601 F. Supp. 1502 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (SJT used
solely on issue of damages, litigants encouraged to use binding SJT); Audlee v. New England
Tank Indus. of N.H., Inc., No. 83-3568, slip op. (D. Mass. Dec. 23, 1985) (SJT demonstrated
that despite complicated case, fact-finding group could judge issue of liability); Rocco Wine
Dist., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Wine Co., 596 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (cause set to be
submitted to SJT after joint settlement status conference).
185. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
186. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
187. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988).
188. Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
189. 120 F.R.D. at 43.
190. Id.at 51.
191. Id.at 49. The court recognized Judge Posner's concerns about the proven efficacy of
the device, Posner, supra note 47, but cautioned against "smother[ing] a promising infant in
the cradle." Id. at 50.
192. 119 F.R.D. at 448.
193. 123 F.R.D. at 603.
194. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. at 444-49; Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. at 604-05.
195. 115 F.R.D. 333 (S.D. Il1. 1987), rev'd, 830 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d
884 (7th Cir. 1988).
196. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887.
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was simply too great to allow a judge to force the SJT procedure on a
97
resisting litigant who is determined to avail herself of a trial on the merits.
The district court judge in Strandell held the plaintiffs' lawyer in contempt
when he refused to participate in a summary jury trial. 19 The lawyer had
refused to participate in the procedure, which was suggested by the judge
on the eve of trial, because settlement appeared unlikely, the plaintiffs had
exhaustively prepared for a full trial pursuant to the court's own pre-trial
schedule, such a procedure would be unnecessarily costly, the procedure
would give the defendants evidence that the court had previously ruled was
no longer discoverable, and the district court did not have the power to
force plaintiffs to participate in a procedure to which they adamantly
objected. Agreeing with the plaintiffs, the Seventh Circuit reversed the
contempt order, bluntly stating that a mandatory SJT is plainly inconsistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 199
The Seventh Circuit based its Strandell decision on the lack of judicial
authority to order mandatory settlement procedures, finding that such
2
powers were outside the purview of both Rule 16 and inherent power. 00
The court was worried that the device might allow the defendants access to
information that was not otherwise discoverable (i.e., the court-ordered
discovery deadline had passed, and the defendants had chosen not to avail
themselves of evidence that would subsequently be previewed at the SJT).
Yet the court's discomfort was fueled by more than a possible discovery
violation. The Strandell court recognized the potentially disastrous effect
that a mandatory SJT could have on a fair application of the Federal Rules.
The court stated that not only was there a total lack of explicit authority
for forcing litigants to endure the device, but that such an imposition would
result in a "radical surgery" of the Rules by upsetting the "equal balance"
between litigants3 °' The court warned that a "crowded docket does not
permit the [district] court to avoid the adjudication of cases properly within
its congressionally-mandated jurisdiction." ' 20 2 While innovative procedures
might be admirable, observed the Strandell court, those with the SJT's
potential impact were better left to the Supreme Court and the Congress. 2°
VI.

PROBLEMS WrIH TBE SummARY JuRY TRiAL

The summary jury trial's most glaring problem is that there is no
consensus over the operation of the procedure. Three district courts 204 have
197.
198.
199.
200.

See id. at
Strandell,
Strandell,
See id. at

886-88.
115 F.R.D. at 336.
838 F.2d at 888.
887-88.

201. See id. at 888.

202. Id.
203. See id.
204. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (discussion of those federal courts that
have subsequently challenged the Seventh Circuit's holding that mandatory SJTs are prohibited).
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opposed the Seventh Circuit's proscription on mandatory summary jury
trials.20 5 This conflict is particularly acute because it underscores the systemic
problems with ad hoc implementation of the device. The propriety of a
mandatory SJT necessarily hinges on an interpretation of nebulous concepts
such as inherent authority 2° 6 and the spirit of the Federal Rules. 20 7 Yet, the
SJT is objectionable precisely because it must derive its source of authority
from these shadowy bounds. 20 8 Because the express power to compel the
procedure cannot be found in the Federal Rules, 209 its use violates fundamental procedural principles-namely lack of notice and uniformity.
A litigant filing suit in federal court now faces the following problem. If
she files suit in the Seventh Circuit, she cannot be forced to participate in
a SJT. But what if she files the exact same suit in Kentucky (where one
court has held that she can be forced to participate)? 210 Will the district
court judge follow his local colleague and order her to participate in a SJT,
or will he follow the Seventh Circuit (the only circuit court to address the
issue), thus leaving an intra-district split? If the judge does follow his
colleague, will other courts in the circuit follow him, or will they agree with
the Seventh Circuit, thus leaving an intra-circuit split? In any event, until
the outstanding cases are reconciled, there is an inter-circuit split.
A clear articulation of the limits to ad hoc ADR is necessary to eliminate
discretionary restrictions on court access, procedural irregularities and disparate treatment of litigants. Such an articulation is necessary because there
are a number of situations, as the Strandell court identified, where ad hoc
devices such as the SJT are inappropriate.
The potential for abuse of discovery rules (i.e., using the SJT as a fishing
expedition) is one important consideration. One might question the necessity
for pretrial discovery orders if counsel can simply ignore deadlines and wait
21
for a preview of the opponent's case. '
The integrity of the SJT verdict is another important concern. While the
elaborate rules and procedures that accompany trial may be complex, they
have presumably developed with the purpose of gleaning truth from muddled
and disputed facts. To be effective, ad hoc procedures must necessarily
short-cut these rules. Yet, shortcutting invariably reduces, to some degree,

205. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
206. See supra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 448 (concluding that
Rule 16 sanctions the use of the SJT because "[t]he obvious purpose and aim of Rule 16 is
to allow courts the discretion and processes necessary for intelligent and effective case
management and disposition.").
208. Cf. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
209. Id.
210. McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
211. Cf. Maatman, supra note 47, at 475.
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the integrity and credibility of the truth-finding process in the eyes of the
litigants who must accept the short-cuts.
As most trial lawyers will attest, the credibility of a witness can seriously
impact interpretations or determinations of fact. For instance, in a complicated breach of contract or fraud case between competing corporations, the
testimony of key management personnel or customers may establish or
refute intent, motive or bad faith. The mandatory SJT, however, necessarily
restricts or eliminates such valuable testimony to save time. If the success
of a case depends on the credibility of witnesses, the SJT will be a waste
of time, save for the additional discovery opportunity for the opponent,
because the adversely affected party will demand a full trial to present these
212

facts.
In addition, some cases, especially those involving intricate financial
transactions, are excruciatingly complex. In these cases, an understanding
of voluminous factual details may be crucial to a just resolution of the
underlying dispute. 213 For example, to determine whether a corporation has
violated the antitrust laws, the fact-finder might be expected to acquire a

working understanding of the prevailing business practices and basic macroeconomic principles. 214 While this understanding might take a significant

amount of time, it is necessary to reach a just conclusion in light of the
huge monetary damages involved. In such a case, the fact-finder cannot
possibly gain the requisite knowledge after a short presentation of the facts
by the party's counsel. Assuming the litigant desires total vindication and

does not want to settle, 25 a summary jury trial would force the litigant to
suffer through a procedure that, in all probability, would lack serious
benefit. 21 6 Moreover, if this is the litigant's position, the potential for

212. Judge Lambros suggests that if credibility will be a determinative factor, the SJT
should be modified to permit witness testimony. See Lambros, supra note 53, at 690. The
problem with this approach is that it is difficult for the judge to predict the credibility of a
witness before he testifies, or to assess the strength of the testimony during pretrial. If the
litigant and judge disagree as to the weight of a given piece of credibility evidence, the judge
prevails in denying the testimony if the SJT is mandatory, and this undermines the litigant's
confidence in the outcome. Moreover, even if the judge does permit limited witness testimony,
time constraints may prevent adequate exploration of the witness' credibility.
213. Maatman, supra note 47, at 483.
214. See, e.g., R. PosNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTrrRusT 347-54 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing
the elaborate economic principles necessary to discover and prove the existence of "market
power," an element that may be necessary to establish monopolization).
215. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989)
("We do not view 'authority to settle' as a requirement that corporate representatives must
come to court willing to settle on someone else's terms . . ." and "a district court cannot
coerce settlement."); Hess v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 846 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1988)
(a defendant convinced it did no wrong may insist on total vindication and may resist settlement
negotiations).
216. Any resulting determination by the abbreviated jury would lack the reasonable credibility
necessary to induce serious settlement negotiations because both parties would perceive that
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"sham" participation arises. 217
Litigants should not be required to preview their strategy, tactics and
level of expertise to their opponent. While it is clear that "[t]rial by ambush
is no longer an acceptable method of practice,' '218 it is equally clear that
not all attorneys exhibit the same degree of competence, nor do all litigants
pay the same attorney fees. The current judicial system is still adversarial,
and a litigant is "entitled to the strategic advantage of information to which
the other side has not sought access. ' 21 9 A mandatory SJT not only requires
a litigant to summarize her case for her opponents later use at trial, but it
may result in the litigant making some type of admission, which would not
otherwise have been discoverable, and which damages the case at trial.?
As a matter of public policy, there are certain cases that are simply
inappropriate for disposition at the summary jury trial. Cases that have
social implications beyond the individual dispute-civil rights cases for
example-would be stripped of their precedential value because of the
nonbinding, procedurally relaxed atmosphere of the SJT. Certain disputes,
though initiated by private litigants, transcend private interest, and forcing
suits with a strong public interest component to bypass public trial is not
advantageous to society. The SJT can force such bypassing because the
procedure may effect the outcome of a trial (e.g., through the discovery
abuses, opportunities for admissions, or judicial bias, etc. discussed above),
thereby effectively coercing settlement. Moreover, since the goal of the SJT
is to promote settlement, incentives to litigate causes for society's benefit
(i.e., treble or punitive damages, attorneys fees, and publicity) would cease
to have effect if cases were routinely settled because litigants were unwilling

the verdict was based on a factual presentation wholly different than that which could be
expected at a full trial. In this sense, the process is flawed because fact determinations are
simply too superficial. See Fiss, Second-Hand Justice?, Connecticut Law Tribune, Mar. 17,
1986, at 10, col. 1.
The third-party methods of ADR that eventuate in a judgment include the
presentation of the facts and the law-a trial-but that trial is markedly less
thorough and far-reaching than a judicial one. In some cases, it is also less
structured or formal. This is obviously so with minitrials or summary jury trials,
as the labels imply, but is also true of more standard third-party ADR methods
such as arbitration; that is a principal source of their attractiveness. And although
something is gained from the informality and brevity (namely, money), something
is also lost: the normative power that is generated by a process that is deliberate
and meticulous. ...
Id.
217. See Maatman, supra note 47, at 475.
218. Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc. 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 (D. Minn. 1988).
219. Pantry Queen Foods v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, 809 F.2d 451, 456 (7th Cir. 1987); see
also United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Maatman,
supra note 47, at 476-77.
220. Cf. G. Heileman, 871 F.2d at 662 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
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to endure both an ad hoc procedure and a full trial.221 This danger is
especially great where the probability of success at trial may well be

22
compromised by participation in the preliminary procedure. 2
Finally, there are some disputes in which the litigants' primary motivation
for filing suit does not involve monetary compensation or redress, but rather
involves an overwhelming element of personal vindication. 3 The litigant
may desire a published opinion, on the record, that absolves her of any
complicity in an alleged practice or that publicly clears her reputation. The
media may notice such formal opinions, thus providing the only remedy
possible when a dispute involves harm to reputation or integrity. In these
situations, litigants are unlikely to settle, despite a judicial perception to

the contrary, and, for them, the SJT is a futile exercise.
CONCLUSION

Something must be done to lessen the demand on the federal judiciary.

The Supreme Court and the Congress may decide that society as a whole
is better served by relaxing or eliminating certain procedures, and such a
solution would perhaps be proper if implemented through the democratic
process. But the use of mandatory ad hoc procedures, independently imposed
by the judiciary for the sake of judicial economy, is a dangerous solution.
As Judge Jack Weinstein argues:
[I]f cases are growing in the federal courts, so be it! That is what judges
and courts are there to do: to hear cases. We are public servants pledged
to do justice, not exalted elites who bless the masses with such bites of
judicial time as we deign to dole out. If some judges are truly overburdened, then the first resort should be to add judges or to add support
staff, not to shut the courthouse doorY

Solutions to the federal docket crunch must adhere to the most fundamental of procedural principles: They must provide litigants with notice and

221. This is possible because the preparation required for a summary jury trial and a
traditional trial are very different. See Maatman, supra note 47, at 482. The extra cost involved
in the added preparation may dissuade a lawyer from taking a difficult case.
222. A litigant who refuses to participate in a summary jury trial urged by a judge anxious
to clear a crowded court docket may hurt her case at trial. In Strandell, when the plaintiffs
refused to participate in the SJT, a trial date that was set for early 1987 was delayed, on
motion of the judge, three times; a period that amounted to almost two years. See G.
Heileman, 871 F.2d at 657 (Posner, J., dissenting) ("[i]t is the rare attorney who will invite
a district judge's displeasure by defying a request to [accede to a judge's pre-trial request]").
223. Whether a court of law is the appropriate forum for such a dispute is irrelevant in
light of the traditional role of the tribunal as a place for equitable remedies (whatever the
nature of that remedy). It is certainly true that some relief, such as in a slander or libel action,
may only be available through a public proceeding. The SJT, by contrast, is a closed affair.
See Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900, 902-05 (6th Cir. 1988)
(summary jury trial not open to the public and press).
224. Weinstein, supra note 4, at 1909-10.
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information, and they must treat litigants equally and uniformly. The appeal
of expedited process is certainly attractive, but it is important that it not
become the consuming motivation of the system.22 Regardless of the judiciary's workload, courts must permit a litigant to proceed to trial without
suffering through ill-defined and under-regulated pretrial procedures.

225. "If judicial reform benefits only judges, then it isn't worth pursuing. If it holds out
only progress for the legal profession, then it isn't worth pursuing. It is worth pursuing only
if it helps to redeem the promise of America." Higgenbotham, The Priorityof Human Rights
in Court Reform, 70 F.R.D. 134, 138 (1976).

